Objective: As human factors and ergonomics (HF/E) moves to embrace a greater systems perspective concerning human-machine technologies, new and emergent properties, such as resilience, have arisen. Our objective here is to promote discussion as to how to measure this latter, complex phenomenon.
IntroductIon
In an important psychological sense, resilience represents how people respond to stress or trauma (e.g., Infurna & Luthar, 2016) . However, the focus of the present article is on the adaptivity and resilience of macrocognitive work systems. These are human-machine or sociotechnical work systems that require cognition to adapt to complexity . Many cases can be cited in which macrocognitive work systems have had to be adaptive and resilient (e.g., Caldwell, 2014) . When the tsunami wave triggered the meltdown at the Daiichi nuclear power plant in Fukushima, Japan on March 11, 2011, power was lost to the control computers. Operators took to the parking lots, extracted batteries from cars, and linked them together in order to reenable control. This remarkable act constituted an important existence proof that humans, in interdependent relationships with machines, can achieve amazing feats of rescue and recovery. In a somewhat similar manner, the people of the city of New Orleans proved resilient in confronting the disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina. Over and over again, we witness episodes of what have piquantly been termed "successful disasters" (see e.g., Lovell & Kruger, 1994) , often proposed in the sense of emotional strength and resolve to recover from traumatic experiences.
Resilience engineering as a term is now gaining significant traction in a number of applied disciplines (e.g., see Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006) . Resilience engineering has been the topic of several symposia in realms as diverse as cyber, control, and communication systems. Recently funded research programs include calls for the development of technologies that manifest adaptive and resilient capacities. As we in human factors and ergonomics (HF/E) have seen, concepts that come to the forefront of concern in this manner are often diluted, simply to become the next "flavor of the month" through both overselling and uncritical use. In such evolutions or revolutions, the definition of terms 686248H FSXXX10.1177/0018720816686248Human FactorsMeasuring Resilience often proves to be a problematic issue that frequently threatens to derail important conceptual progress. What is required is a set of carefully worded and clear statements, together with an associated method by which concepts such as resilience can be measured and distinguished from other allied concepts. It is our aspiration here to posit such a definition for the consideration and critique of our community.
defInIng AdAptIvIty And resIlIence
As Woods (2015) has pointed out, a considerable number of concept-terms have been used in discussions of resilience and adaptivity. Such discussions often use concept-terms to define one another. For example, Alberts (2002) defined the agile system as one that is robust, flexible, and adaptable. Robustness, in turn, is articulated as the ability of a work system to maintain effectiveness across a range of tasks, situations, and contexts. Flexibility, in its turn, is regarded as the capacity to engage multiple resolution paths toward specified system goals. To close the circle, adaptability is defined as the ability of an organization to change, which is parenthetically called agility (Alberts & Hayes, 2003) .
Pulakos et al. (Ilgen & Pulakos, 1999; Pulakos, Arad, Donovan, & Plamondon, 2000) defined adaptivity as involving the following capacities: creative problem solving, coping with uncertainty, learning new tasks and skills, adapting to teamwork and collaboration, changing procedures and developing new procedures, and adapting across cultures (both national and organizational). They found this listing valuable in the analysis of workplace challenges and suggestive of a method for job analysis. For our present purposes, it is noteworthy that the descriptions of the listed capacities rely, either tacitly or explicitly, on the concept of adaptation in order to define adaptivity.
Yet another view describes resilience as a form of "rebound," implying that the work system's goals and methods have not fundamentally changed and the system gets "back on track" after it has experienced surprise or perturbation. This idea can be regarded as adaptation (in hysteretic form) rather than resilience (see Hancock & Warm, 1989; Jansen, Sawyer, van Egmond, de Ridder, & Hancock, 2016; Morgan & Hancock, 2011) .
Thus, we see that operational concepts of adaptivity and resilience can be traced across different forums of human factors research (Hancock & Chignell, 1987 and, in particular, the work on anomaly response in aviation incidents and nuclear power emergencies (Woods, 1988) . In studies of various kinds of accidents, "resilience analysis" is the identification of strategies that workers use to avoid making errors (Furniss, Back, Blanford, Hildebrandt, & Broberg, 2011; Hassall, Sanderson, & Cameron, 2016) . Notwithstanding these valuable contributions, in order to make further systematic progress we need to develop meaningful and useful operational definitions and devise means for measuring adaptivity and resilience. The following definitions are offered:
Adaptivity is the capacity of a work system to achieve its goals, despite the emergence of circumstances that perturb it from a predetermined course by pushing it toward the boundaries of its competence envelope. The work system is able to employ multiple resources (personnel, materiel, finance, etc.) in multiple ways to recover, or it may even develop new ways to succeed, and in doing so can move seamlessly among them. The work system can reallocate and redirect its resources and activities to retrench from the boundaries of its competence envelope and thus still achieve its goals.
Adaptation is itself one of the major macrocognitive functions , but additional macrocognitive processes contribute to adaptive capacity, such as collaboration and common-ground maintenance (for teamwork) as well as problem detection and attention management (for sensemaking).
We juxtapose the definition of adaptivity with resilience. Here we define resilience as follows:
Resilience is the systemic capacity to change as a result of circumstances that push the system beyond the boundaries of its competence envelope. The system may have to amend some, or even all of its goals, procedures, resources, roles, or responsibilities. As a result of those changes, the work system then expresses a revised competence envelope. In effect, it becomes a different system (see also Woods & Branlat, 2011) .
In their dictionary meanings, adaptivity implies change and resilience involves stability (e.g., Merriam-Webster, 2003) . But in the context of macrocognitive work systems, these conceptterms take on connotations that are subtly different from such common interpretations. In a general sense, we can view adaptability as the search for stability in an already occupied parameter space. Resilience in contrast is the achievement of a new state of stability in a different parameter space. We now look to cloth these definitions through reference to some examples from applicable areas of research, many of which are familiar to our HF/E community.
exAmples
Examples of adaptation and resilience can be found in aviation, military affairs, health care, and weather forecasting, among many others. Indeed, we will eventually argue that adaptivity and resilience are potentially inherent characteristics of all macrocognitive work systems.
cockpit Automation
Cockpit automation has proved highly effective but has resulted in a degree of brittleness (and accidents) in certain situations (see . Thus, in ongoing operations that naturally "test" system response capacities, there arose a gap in "fitness." Initially, the work system's response was to reinforce prescribed procedures and roles (adaptation). However, eventually there came the recognition of a need for a more fundamental form of change (resilience). This need meant an imperative to learn more about such brittleness and the circumstances in which it was expressed. The result was a readjustment of roles and coordination procedures under circumstances where flight crews were given direct control. Having explored the boundaries of its traditional range of adaptation, the system moved resiliently (and in this case, successfully) to another mode of operation.
Asymmetric Warfare
The U.S. military changed when it was confronted with new forms of adversity and conflict in the Middle East. There arose a gap in the fitness of the military, being evident in the shortfall in its ability to achieve its primary mission. Resilience here involved a change to training in the form of a new National Training Center, at which fighting units were put up against "Red Team" adversaries of experienced warfighters. Such learning also involved changes to the military's concept of operations and rules of engagement. These changes meant that there were new resources, new roles, new responsibilities, and even new goals. The army's overarching descriptive concern-the successful accomplishment of its warfighting mission-did not alter. However, a key goal did, which involved radical systemic change in the methods of training warfighters in the best possible ways to meet the new challenges.
three mile Island
At first, the cause of this incident was not well understood. What was clear, however, was that the situation was not, and perhaps could not have been, anticipated or managed by the plant. The controlling utility and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had to invest themselves in a new enterprise, the emergency management business. They needed to change their procedures and not just modify or adapt existing processes. The NRC created a new Technical Support Center and established a new role, the shift technical advisor. These professionals provide expertise in coping with novel situations during continuing operations. They also coordinate with local authorities. Again, the NRC's primary descriptive goal did not change-successful regulation of the nuclear power industry. However, it added a second and equally important goal-engaging in emergency management. This entailed new roles, responsibilities, and procedures (see .
electronic Intensive care units (eIcus)
Networking technology now makes it possible to link physician-specialists into ICUs to provide guidance to nurses. The initial claim was that there would be a savings of time, effort, and resources by virtue of the distributed nature of the EICU. But there were costs of time, effort, and resources to train ICU nurses and physicians in the new networking procedures. Adaptation would also be required for the mentoring of ICU nurses by the physicians, now via the electronic medium. But resilience activities were also required. The ICU nurse is trained as a nurse, not as a manager and coordinator of a distributed team. Management and coordination would mean time not devoted to patient care. The ICU nurse's responsibilities had to change. There was a need to develop new roles. That is, someone had to coordinate the EICUs, someone had to manage new billing processes that the EICU required in order for the service to stand on its own economically, and expertise at working in an EICU became its own new specialty (Anders, Patterson, Woods, & Elbright, 2007) . We see here adaptation pressed beyond its limits, entailing a need for resilience.
Weather forecasting
A U.S. Navy weather forecasting facility perceived a need to preserve its local expertise when confronted by the imminent retirement of its "boomer" generation of senior personnel. The initial adaptation was to begin video recording of weekly weather briefings that senior forecasters gave to pilots and to trainee forecasters. Unfortunately, but predictably, those videos collected dust because they did not map easily onto the material that trainees had to study in order to qualify as forecasters. The resilient solution involved establishing a local knowledge base of forecasting procedures and climatological heuristics and folding the training material into that knowledge base. The trainees now had an entirely new method and resource for learning the forecasting process. The forecasters now had a new role and responsibility: to contribute to and maintain the knowledge base (Hoffman, LaDue, Trafton, Roebber, & Mogil, in press) .
As these examples indicate, resilience is an extension of adaptation. However, it is more than simply a degree of adaptive variation in current procedures to compensate for momentary perturbance in order to stay within the existing "nominal" envelope. The ubiquity of such potential transitions is now particularly evident in the onset of so-called driverless vehicles. Here, the standard driver adaptation to differing levels of automated support can be juxtaposed to the overall resilience of systems, which prospectively looks to excise the human controller altogether. Measuring the effectiveness and efficiency of such states and transitions is an essential HF/E enterprise.
A theme similar to ours has recently been expressed by Caldwell (2014) , who discussed successful emergency response as the "return to reasonable operations" following a disturbance. A work system is able to reachieve its goals and continue to exercise its ordinary procedures. Things get back to normal or back to a previously observed dynamic equilibrium. This theme is the restabilization notion which we have defined as adaptivity. In our concept, resilience involves changes to goals as well as resources and procedures because there arises a "new normal" that specifies new and different equilibrium states.
A distinction similar to ours has been established in the field of systems theory. For example, in their treatments of the biology of knowledge, Maturana and Varella (1980) distinguished between "perturbations" and "destructive interactions." First, they asserted that adaptive systems must manifest some sort of correspondence (i.e., a "coupling") between the system's components and its environment. As a result of events in the environment, components of the system and features in the environment interact with one another, resulting in a change of system state. In a perturbation, neither states nor state changes alter the class membership of the system. Thus, adaptation is a response to perturbations in which the system components are regenerated (the coupling is reinstated), and the system's boundaries remain unchanged. In this way, adaptability is strongly linked to Bernard's (1878 Bernard's ( -1879 Bernard's ( /1974 ) "fixité du milieu intérieur" and Canon's (1932) subsequent expression of "homeostasis." The inherent tendency to stability in these circumstances has not been pushed beyond its capacity to recover. However, in what Maturana and Varella called a destructive interaction, the system cannot simply compensate, regenerate, or reassert itself; rather, it transitions to become another system.
Our distinction between adaptivity and resilience is also reflected in Woods and Wreathall's (2008) analogy to "stress" versus "strain" in materials engineering (and see Hancock & Warm, 1989; Hancock, Williams, Miyake, & Manning, 1995) . In a diagram in which the y-axis is the increasing stress placed on a material and the x-axis is how the material stretches, the function shows increasing stretch as the material is stressed but only up to a point at which the material begins to fail. At that point, the function bifurcates. In one (downward) path, the material stretches a bit more and then fails, but in another (upward) path, the material restructures in a way that enables it to continue to cope with the increasing demands. Woods and Wreathall focused on the various costs of engaging in that restructuring when the analogy is carried over to macrocognitive work systems, that is, changes in workload, the need to develop new forms of expertise, the costs of resources, and so on. In the analysis we present here, we focus on how to operationalize and therefore measure this restructuring. We consider this in the context of cognitive work systems, although it is evident that such a measurement approach could, in principle, be extended to other natural and technical systems (see also Hancock, 2014a) .
Our definitions of adaptivity and resilience hinge on the concept of boundary conditions of the competence envelope. Our definition of the work system's competence envelope is similar to Caldwell's (2014) notion of a "resilience boundary." This boundary is more than metaphor. We define this envelope as a multidimensional space that is characterized by the parameters that are used to describe the task and problem situations that are visible to the work system (and see Hancock & Warm, 1989, Figure 3) . Resilience entails changing the parameters that define this competence envelope. Robustness represents the work system being effective and efficient in achieving goals under a broad range of values of the parameters that define the work system's competence envelope (see Gluck et al., 2012) .
meAsures for mAcrocognItIve Work systems
The need for measures that illuminate features and phenomena at the system level has been widely recognized (cf. Hoffman, Norman, & Vagners, 2009 ). Traditionally, human performance is gauged in terms of efficiency values, often referred to as "HEAT" measures: hits, errors, accuracy, and time (Hoffman, 2010a) . Such econometrically motivated measures often speak to the dehumanized nature of work systems (Hancock, 2014b (Hancock, , 2016 . HEAT measures can be blind to other significant aspects of work systems. Is the work method learnable? Does it help workers achieve expertise? Does it motivate or demotivate the workers (Hancock, Pepe, & Murphy, 2005) ? Are the tools themselves understandable and usable? Are the humans and machines engaged in a genuine interdependence relationship in which they can make their intent and goals observable? (see Hoffman, Hancock, & Bradshaw, 2010; Hoffman, Marx, Amin, & McDermott, 2010; Klein, Woods, Bradshaw, Hoffman, & Feltovich, 2004) . These latter, important dimensions of effectivity are completely missed by the limited and sterile HEAT methods, which are frequently employed as exclusive representations of work system activity.
Macrocognitive work systems must adapt to complexity . Macrocognitive work systems are governed by this and other lawful regularities, such as the law of stretched systems, which states, Every macrocognitive work system is stretched to operate at its capacity. As soon as there is some improvement or new technology, some stakeholders will identify opportunities the change makes possible to achieve some of their goals. The process of exploiting these opportunities will result in a new and greater intensity and tempo of activity as the work system moves toward the edge of its competence envelope. (Woods, 2002, p. 14; see also Hoffman & Woods, 2005; Hollnagel, 2009) It is exceptionally rare for macrocognitive work systems to match their environment exactly; there are virtually always gaps in fitness. Of course, fitness itself always represents a moving target. Limited resources and inevitable uncertainties lead almost necessarily to unavoidable gaps in knowledge. Thus, there is always "effort after meaning," although such struggles to acquire and deploy knowledge may fluctuate. Macrocognitive work systems are limited in their ability to alter their perspective cost-effectively. Sensemaking gaps widen because situations differ in how strongly they signal the need to shift perspectives and thus reveal what has formerly been hidden. Macrocognitive work systems divide roles and responsibilities for different subsets of goals. Thus, there are gaps in resultant authority and responsibility, which means that all macrocognitive work systems are simultaneously cooperative over shared goals and potentially competitive when goals conflict. Macrocognitive work systems are restricted in the ways they can act to influence situations. Distributing activities that define progress toward goals can increase the range of effective action, but increasing the distribution of activities entails the difficulty associated with keeping them coherent and synchronized (Hoffman & Woods, 2011) . These lawful constraints are reflected in our presently developed measures. First, however, we must ask, what do we require of such measures? requIrements for meAsures of AdAptIvIty And resIlIence
Measurement of the adaptivity of macrocognitive work systems necessarily requires that the work be conducted in circumstances where adaptation itself is actually needed for success. Likewise for resilience. One way of achieving this "state of being measurable" is through experimental manipulation. This process would involve the engagement of an identified work system in a series of preplanned scenarios that are specifically designed to trigger adaptive and/or resilient responses. These could also be constituted by a series of familiar scenarios in which specific errors or design breakdowns are intentionally introduced. This approach has the advantage of control via a priori scenario design and thus assurance that adaptivity or resilient reactions will be required. The disadvantage is that such scenario design is a highly effortful and time-consuming activity, even for so-called nominal or routine scenarios. Examples of this type of approach can be found in observational simulation training conducted by Dibello, Missildine, and Struttman (2009) and the decision-making exercise method developed by Klein (2003) . These methods are successful for "accelerated expertise" by placing individuals and teams in situations that require both adaptation and resilience, as we have defined them here .
A second approach involves leveraging the ready observability of a macrocognitive work system. Here, actual operational activity is regarded as an appropriate opportunity to collect empirical evidence. The advantage is that one can gather baseline measures of work system activity in circumstances where neither adaptivity nor resilience is invoked. The disadvantage is that one cannot know a priori when circumstances will arise that will require such adaptivity or resilience and thus enable useful and effective measurement of them. And, of course, when such circumstances do arise, it may not be wise, appropriate, permissible, or even possible to employ such operational events as empiric opportunities.
Measures and metrics themselves do not spontaneously emerge. They are derived through design and by policy decisions (Hoffman, 2010a (Hoffman, , 2010b . The process first begins with a highlevel theoretical concept, such as adaptivity or resilience. This concept is then analyzed and defined to identify component features or elements, such as "change in work process" or "responsiveness to the environment." Next, each theoretical concept must be given an operational definition. Operational definitions describe, to whatever level of detail is required or possible, how one proceeds with the act of taking measurements. At this point, descriptions of measures are often in danger of becoming excessively verbose. So, for example, change of a work process might be operationally defined as the respecification of a work procedure by a responsible or authoritative worker, such that at least one change is made to either the steps of the process, the goals of the process, or the responsibilities of the workers who conduct the process. It is here that the issue of language as both tool and information plays a crucial role.
Next, one's measurements must be understood in terms of some sort of useful scale or associated structure. This step maps measurements onto numbers so that operations performed on the numbers correspond, in some way, to the expressed dynamics of the phenomenon being measured. For example, one could count the number of work process changes made during a scenario, and that frequency could be compared with the total number of processes engaged in such a scenario. The result would be a scale of relative frequency, which could be interpreted as a reflection of the adaptation that had occurred. The precise ways in which such a measure would map to nominal, ordinal, interval, and/or ratio scales represent a significant challenge to our discipline and, indeed, all of science (Velleman & Wilkinson, 1993) .
What follows represents perhaps the most critical step: that of forming a metric. Metrics are thresholds or decision points used to specify value judgments. So, for example, in a scale of "amount of adaptation," does a 15% change mean that the work system was not very adaptive? Metrics do not come from the theory of the work domain or the theory of measurement. They come from policy decisions. Clarity on this point is critical, since the word metric has proved to be a widely abused one (and see Hoffman & Hancock, 2014) . Policy decisions are social agreements about what is and is not collectively acceptable.
A final consideration in stage setting for resilience measurement is that, for measurement at the work system level, the most important measures will involve relativities, or conditional dependencies. So, for example, a measure of "number of adaptations" needs to be relativized on the assumption that the work system was able, in the scenario under scrutiny, to actually achieve its primary goal. If it was not successful, one would consider that the work system was minimally adaptive, no matter how many process changes were enacted. This consideration highlights two further facets of measurement, namely, (a) measures are always interpretations, and (b) measures always have limitations. Indeed, one central purpose in making and evaluating all types of measurement is to always seek their improvement.
conceptuAl meAsures of AdAptIve
And resIlIence cApAcIty Adaptivity and resilience then need also to be measured and evaluated with reference to two different time frames. One can ask about the adaptive and resilience capacity-the potential of a work system before it has been put to the test. One can also ask about the effective adaptivity and resilience of a work system during or after it has been put to that test. In a prospective analysis, a situation requiring adaptivity or resilience has not yet occurred. Instead, effort, resources, and the quality of preparation have to be considered as primary conceptual measurables.
One approach to the measurement of adaptive capacity derives from an insight of Klein (2014) , that a work system can be evaluated in terms of the extent to which it has institutionalized one or more barriers to resilience. These barriers Klein calls "incapacity factors." An organization can do a number of things that drive a work system to incapacity: It can fix a chain of command; it can enforce adherence to procedures, goals, and schedules; it can emphasize risk evaluation and error avoidance; it can insist that decisions be based on consensus; it can require that verification and review of plans proceed up the leadership hierarchy; it can require that deviations from established procedures receive approval. Klein's incapacity analysis regards insight as the key to resilience, and the organizational incapacity factors serve to suppress the pursuit and enactment of insights. The development of insights takes effort. Insights can be unpredictable in their etiology and their consequences. Implementing an insight means giving up current plans in return for something that might not necessarily be better and might lead to inefficiencies and (worse) might lead to mistakes that are visible. Klein's idea of incapacity measures is similar in spirit to Woods' (2016) notion that technologies (and work systems) have to be designed so as to be extensible over their life cycle as new challenges and contexts arise. Doing so requires evaluation of work system's performance in terms of its brittleness rather than just in terms of its demonstrable capabilities.
Klein's notion is that the evaluation of capacity can be with respect to policies and procedures of the work system. Does the work system have mechanisms in place to recognize when change is needed? Does the work system have individuals and teams that have had experience in dealing with situations that require adaptivity?
Policies and procedures that can contribute to, or detract from, adaptive and resilience capacity can be categorized with reference to the major macrocognitive processes of sensemaking (Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006a , 2006b ), replanning (Klein, 2007a (Klein, , 2007b , and coordinating (Johnson, Bradshaw, Hoffman, Feltovich, & Woods, 2014) . In their basic forms, Sensemaking informs the work system about whether and when it needs to change its understanding of problem situations. In other words, adaptive and resilient sensemaking requires mechanisms for recognizing anomalies and situations that mandate change. Flexecution describes how the replanning activity proceeds when goals, resources, roles, and/or responsibilities have to change even while such goals and overarching mission objectives are being pursued. Regrounding describes how agents in a macrocognitive work system depend on one another to accomplish their unique, as well as their shared goals, and to determine when, why, and how roles and responsibilities have to be changed.
The data-frame model of sensemaking, the flexecution model of replanning, and the regrounding model of coordination are presented here in Figures 1, 2, and 3 , respectively. The empirical research that revealed sensemaking and flexecution activities in naturalistic decision-making contexts has been described by Klein (2007a Klein ( , 2007b , and Klein et al. (2006a Klein et al. ( , 2006b ). The empirical research that has revealed the activities in team collaboration and interdependence has been given by Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, and Kendall (2006) Salas and Fiore (2004) . Thus, the models (and Table 1 ) incorporate notions of shared mental models, shared intent, and common ground.
These three models share a similar morphology. A primary closed loop at the apex of each model is the main macrocognitive activity. Stemming from that primary loop are three paths: question and preserve, question and adjust, and question and reject. In macrocognitive models, activities are conceived as being continuous, parallel, and interactive. Not only are the individual models composed entirely of closed loops, but the three major activities are themselves regarded as also being continuous, parallel, and interacting. These models are not input-output models laying out steps or stages. However, reframing, regrounding, and replanning are often triggered by surprise, which accords directly with the theme of adaptivity and resilience. In a retrospective analysis of particular events, one can extract from these models a stepwise or stagelike narrative of what happened in any given sequence of events.
To generate measures of adaptive and resilience capacity, one can look at the nodes at the bottom of each of the three models and ask about the success rate and the amount (or proportional amount) of effort, time, and resources that are dedicated to each of the various activities (e.g., confirming/disconfirming a frame, tracking anomalies, evaluating plausibility, generating alternative paths to goals, shifting resources, realigning priorities, implementing new procedures). Such an analysis for a work system could be potentially highly valuable. Although it can certainly be accomplished using established methods of cognitive work analysis, it would require an extremely thorough effort of that sort.
A more immediately practicable approach would be a Klein-inspired analysis of policies and procedures that would ask about availability (whether a procedure is established and available) and effectivity (how effectively the procedure is engaged). This analysis suggests a checklist that might be used to evaluate adaptive and/ or resilience capacity. Table 1 below presents such a checklist covering each of the major macrocognitive activities, based on Figures 1, 2 , and 3. Table 1 should thus make it easier to deal empirically with the complexity required of this multimeasure approach. The work system either has, or does not have, each of the procedures, which in turn either have, or have not, been empirically shown to be effective.
It would certainly be possible to collapse the two availability and effectiveness measures for each conceptual measurable, but we claim that a work system has far more adaptive and resilience capacity if a procedure has been proven effective than if a procedure had merely been established on paper, distributed as a memorandum, or placed on a shelf and called a "plan" or a "best practice." Thus, in using this checklist, the coefficient for the availability measures would be less than that for effectiveness measures. To begin simply, the coefficients might be a rank ordering (1 and 2, respectively). A measurement scale is now formed by dividing the sum for the availability measures by the number of measures and dividing 2 times the sum for the effectiveness measures by the number of measures, and then adding the two resultants. Thus, for adaptive capacity, our proposal is AC (adaptive capacity) = [N(aa) / N(pa)], (1) where N(aa) is the number of adaptations available to the work system and N(pa) is the number of possible adaptations for a work system, as defined by a listing such as that in Table 1 . The minimum real value for AC thus depends on the length of the list, and obtained values could range from zero to 1.0.
Resilience capacity would then combine AC with a similar component for effectiveness, on our assumption made in defining these two concepts, that a resilience capacity presupposes an adaptive capacity. Thus,
where N(ea) is the number of adaptations that are not just available but that have been demonstrated to be effective for that work system. RC depends on both the number of possible adaptations (the first term in Equation 2) and the number of available adaptations (the second term in Equation 2). The minimum real value for RC would be when only one adaptation is available and has been shown to be effective. Obtained values of RC could be rescaled to have 1.0 as their minimum real value by applying a coefficient determined by N(pa).
In the operationalization of this checklist and its associated measurement approach, some person(s) would have to make a "presenceabsence" judgment about the availability and effectiveness for each of the procedures listed in Table 1 . Those judgments would have to be informed by some empirical process, which might range from documentation analysis (i.e., of standard operating procedures) to workplace observations to a full cognitive task analysis (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006; Hoffman & McCloskey, 2013; Klein & Hoffman, 2008) . Further consideration would have to be given to the matter of determining the coefficient and, indeed, whether a coefficient other than the simple rank ordering might have to be assigned to the availability and effectiveness judgments for individual judgment categories. In addition, some Table 1 items may be inappropriate when applied to some work systems or to particular work systems in certain contexts. It would be possible to use a list that does not have all the Table 1 entries or, indeed, a list that has more. However, we can assert on the basis of the literature upon which it is founded that Table 1 expresses the minimum requirements. That said, additional availabilityeffectiveness items might be derived. These are empirical matters, our present goal being to stimulate discussion and not to claim exhaustion of what may very well prove to be a more extensive description.
Given that the present topic is complex, we necessarily advocate for a multimeasure approach. We therefore present a second possible path toward measuring adaptivity and resilience.
meAsures of effectIve AdAptIvIty
And resIlIence
For an analysis of whether a macrocognitive work system had been adaptive and resilient one would naturally expect that many of the factors listed for the analysis of capacity would remain pertinent. Was the work system successful at achieving its goals (both old and new)? How complete and correct were the work system's characterizations of anomalies? And so forth. But unlike the prospective view that capacity measures assume, the retrospective view can use time as a universal measure. Assuming that the work system was successful, one can ask about how long it took the work system to recognize and characterize anomalies, how long it took to specify new goals, how long it took to identify and muster new resources, and so forth. The first step for this evaluation is to determine that a resilience situation was actually encountered and that the work system changed successfully. Such a determination depends on applying the definition of resilience we have presented and exercising judgment. The second step is to determine that the work system moved from an adaptation to a resilience mode of operation. When in an adaptation mode, the work system is attempting to compensate to stresses that have moved it toward the boundaries of its current capacity. It is trying to regain lost ground and make progress toward its existing goals using its existing methods and resources (Hancock & Warm, 1989) . There then comes recognition that the situation is moving beyond the bounds of such normal operations; it is crossing a functionality threshold. Phenomenologically, things do not appear to be going the way they should, and on the human side, "panic" is one likely eventuality (Hancock, 2009) . At this juncture, the resilient work system stops compensating and begins changing. Figure 4 presents our core elements of three time-based measures of effective resilience.
As can be seen in Figure 4 , the sub-event durations are staggered. We do not assume that the redesign of the work necessarily commences immediately when the need to change is recognized. Nor do we assume that a change is implemented at precisely the moment that the process of designing the change is deemed completed. Both of the equations given below express resilience in terms of the proportions of the total event time spent in sub-event activities that are characterized by the staggered phases illustrated in Figure 4 . A resilient work system is one that takes relatively little time to recognize that it cannot simply keep compensating to the current forces that are taxing its work capacity. This defining feature could be scaled as a ratio of R to T (the total time). Smaller numbers here would represent greater resilience.
Equation (3) represents the time it takes the work system to design a new process to achieve a new goal (D) minus the time it takes the work system to recognize (R) that it needed to change. This value is then divided by the total event time (T). Thus, a work system is more efficient in changing if the time to redesign is a smaller fraction of the time it took to recognize a need to make such a change. This work system feature is rescaled to values between 1 and 100. Smaller numbers here again mean greater resilience.
Equation (4) describes the time it takes the work system to begin to implement (I) a new process in order to achieve a new goal. This value is then tempered by the time it took the work system to recognize (R) that it needed to change its existing goal. This product is divided by the total event time (T). Thus, did it take more time to recognize the need to change than it did to implement such a change? Smaller numbers here also mean greater resilience.
In operationalizing this measurement scheme, domain experts would need to determine when a situation that had initially been interpreted as requiring adaptation came to an end and that the work system was in fact engaged in a resiliencedemanding event-that is, the point when it would be recognized that the work system had crossed the boundary of its own competence envelope. Given that macrocognitive work systems engage in contexts involving indeterminate causation, the starting and stopping points for causally related events and causal reasoning are rarely unequivocal or undebatable (Hoffman, Klein, & Miller, 2011) . However, debate here can prove useful and informative, as can the value of proposed measures. Likewise, the times for the additional key events, such as the commencement of replanning and the implementation of new processes, have to be determined by judgment based on some panoply of empirical evidence.
pAths to the future
The gap between conceptual measurables and operational definitions must be spanned. For the evaluation of adaptive and resilience capacity, we have proposed a checklist with a simple measurement scale built from that foundation. In this operationalization, some person or persons would have to make a presenceabsence judgment about each of the procedures listed in Table 1 . For the evaluation of effective resilience, we proposed time-based measures. For these measures, some person or persons would again have to make judgments as to when certain events occurred. Given that previous treatments of the resilience concept have left the concept largely unresolved and almost entirely ungrounded in a measurement methodology, we offer these measures as first steps toward operationalization, as both a prospectus and a springboard for future discussion and development. As with all threshold determinations, inexactitude remains the bane of deterministic science, but human judgment cannot be excised from the measurement process.
There is, as mentioned earlier, also a gap between measures and metrics. We have not sought to span this gap here because doing so requires input from policy. Suppose that in the evaluation of resilience capacity a work system scored a 2.5 on the checklist scale. Is that good? Suppose that in the evaluation of effective resilience the proportion of time taken to recognize the need to change is 25% of the total time. Does that mean the work system showed low, medium, or high resilience? Lest we be accused of being totally arbitrary, we point out that the standards for determining "goodness" in the calculation of values, such as effect size, and indeed the use of 0.05 and 0.01 in hypothesis testing each involve individual and social judgments and choices on the part of experimenters (Stigler, 2008) . We are hopeful that meaningful metrics will emerge from our basic postulates and thus foster everimproving methods for measuring resilience that can be applied so that results can be mutually, rationally, and publically evaluated.
With regard to the measurement of adaptive and resilience capacity, the scheme we have presented assumes that the various factors (Table 1) are not just separable conceptual measurables but are independent. Clearly, there are relations among such elements. For instance, a procedure for recognizing goal conflicts is contingent on establishing and maintaining common ground. Path analysis may be useful in refining measurement schemes in this regard. Also important for measurement is the fact that the factors may not all contribute equally to adaptive or resilience capacity. Although failure for one or more of the factors is inevitable over some indeterminate period, which factors are likely to be failure points and which failures are most dangerous are matters than can be resolved only as we gain more experience, both from the "real world" and from the form of planned experimentation we have advocated.
With regard to the measurement of effective resilience, a commitment to conduct the empirical investigations needed to scale it in the manner we have described would reflect the importance that an organization places on stability in the face of emerging challenges or threats. Conducting such an empirical investigation would itself take time, resources, and effort. Sufficient work analyses, however, could be conducted for a sample of events or for some limited period, supporting the necessary protocol analysis, to determine whether each of the activities specified in Figures 1, 2 , and 3 is adequately "covered." Ideally, such a sample would include routine and as well as off-nominal cases. The sufficiency and efficiency of such a resource allocation and time expenditure strategy itself could also be determined. Thus, is the exercise worth the investment? Of course, we advocate that it is. Retrospectively, a checklist-based scale, such as that in Table 1 , could be employed, comparing the occurrence of activities, the effectiveness of the activities, and the resources made available for those activities. No matter how one defines resilience, assuring that a work system possesses such a capacity will cost money. In the long term, such an analysis may not simply save more money than is invested; it might existentially save the overall system itself. In the short term, time-based measures of resilience capacity with respect to interdependence could be readily implemented.
Although we have attempted to define the concepts of adaptivity and resilience, and apply those definitions all the way across the conceptualoperational gap, we have relied on a number of theoretical concepts that retain openness of meanings, for example, "procedures," as in Table 1 . A complete application of task and job analysis would be required to fully explicate such notions. Also immediately valuable, in our view, would be to develop examples illustrating the notion of the competence envelope, that is, the parameter space for macrocognitive work systems.
In addition to adaptivity and resilience, other related concept-terms are in need of operationalization. Consider robustness as an example. A survey of chapters in a current handbook of cognitive engineering showed that robustness was mentioned in half of the chapters but defined quantitatively in none of them (Walsh, Einstein, & Gluck, 2013) . Gluck and his colleagues (Gluck et al., 2012) defined robustness conceptually as the ability of a work system to "maintain its function when it is perturbed" (pp. 137-138). Although similar to our notion of adaptivity, their approach to measurement involves generating counts of the frequency of work system success and work system failure, estimating the work system's tolerance for failure, and then calculating the stability of work system performance across multiple scenarios. It remains to be seen how their formulae would be operationalized and applied beyond their mathematical simulations, but for present purposes we see here an attempt to quantify another of the many concepts that are current in the analysis of macrocognitive work systems.
Developing measures of the quality of macrocognitive work remains an outstanding challenge (Woods, 2017) . The ideas we present here are purpose designed to elicit challenge and discussion. They are intended to stimulate debate but especially to instigate empirical analysis and cross-disciplinary research. We are hopeful that good measures of the complexity of macrocognitive work systems can be used to predict characteristics such as brittleness and explain why, for example, "faster, better, cheaper" relates directly and necessarily to higher failure rates (de Weck, 2015; Weyuker, 1988) despite all rhetorical assertions to the contrary. We anticipate that valid and reliable measures of resilience will help us to understand the true economic value of applying HF/E precepts of human-centered design in actual operational worlds. The ideas expressed here on the measurement of resilience should be extensible to all types of complex work systems and social organizations, the challenge being a ubiquitous one in our modern technological world.
key poInts
• Resilience is a key feature of success in emerging complex sociotechnical systems.
• Measuring resilience, as opposed to merely invoking the concept, is a critical next step for a science of macrocognitive work systems. We present a basic approach to achieving such a goal in order to stimulate and encourage further debate and analysis of this issue. 
